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
PHILOSOPHY OF EMOTION

Critical Concepts in Philosophy

Edited by
*Aaron Ben-Ze'ev and
Angelika Krebs*

**Volume I
The Nature of Emotions**

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
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CONTENTS

VOLUME I THE NATURE OF EMOTIONS

<i>Preface</i>	xiii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xv
<i>Chronological table of reprinted articles and chapters</i>	xvii
Introduction	1
AARON BEN-ZE'EV	
PART 1	
Historical and systematic surveys	19
1 The philosophy of emotions	21
ROBERT C. SOLOMON	
2 The concept of a person	42
CHARLES TAYLOR	
3 The sophistication of non-human emotion	57
ROBERT C. ROBERTS	
PART 2	
Theories of emotions	75
4 Emotions as judgments of value and importance	77
MARTHA NUSSBAUM	
5 Pivotal distinctions	93
ROBERT M. GORDON	

6 The thing called emotion: a subtle perspective	112
AARON BEN-ZE'EV	
7 Emotions outside the box: the new phenomenology of feeling and corporeality	138
HERMANN SCHMITZ	
8 Embodied emotions	159
JESSE PRINZ	
9 Emotions as evaluative feelings	174
BENNETT W. HELM	
10 The laws of emotion	189
NICO H. FRIJDA	
11 Two movements in emotions: communication and reflection	209
KEITH OATLEY	
12 Paragraphs 464–512 from <i>Zettel</i>	224
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN	
13 Outline of a phenomenological theory	231
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE	
PART 3	
Emotions and rationality	249
14 Truth, authenticity, and rationality	251
RONALD DE SOUSA	
15 A case of mixed feelings: ambivalence and the logic of emotion	273
PATRICIA S. GREENSPAN	
16 Emotions, perceptions, and emotional illusions	296
CHRISTINE TAPPOLET	

VOLUME II EMOTIONS AND THE GOOD LIFE

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
Introduction	1
ANGELIKA KREBS	
PART 4	
Happiness and the meaning of life	19
17 Enjoyment and the quality of life	21
MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI	
18 On calmness: dealing rationally with what is beyond our control	51
FRIEDRICH KAMBARTEL	
19 William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein: a philosophical approach to spirituality	58
HANS JULIUS SCHNEIDER	
20 Autonomy, necessity, and love	74
HARRY G. FRANKFURT	
PART 5	
Emotional sharing	87
21 The virtues of common pursuit	89
NANCY SHERMAN	
22 How we think of others' emotions	111
PETER GOLDIE	
23 How we feel: understanding everyday collective emotion ascription	133
MARGARET GILBERT	

PART 6	
Regulating the emotions	149
24 Emotion regulation: conceptual foundations	151
JAMES J. GROSS AND ROSS A. THOMPSON	
25 Exploring the managed heart	176
ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD	
PART 7	
Emotions and the body	189
26 The source of laughing and crying	191
HELMUTH PLESSNER	
27 Throwing like a girl: a phenomenology of feminine body compartment, motility, and spatiality	209
IRIS MARION YOUNG	
28 The wider role of bodily sense in thought and language	228
EUGENE T. GENDLIN	
PART 8	
The special category of moods	241
29 The nature of <i>Stimmungen</i>: the concept of <i>Stimmung</i>	243
OTTO FRIEDRICH BOLLNOW	
30 The feeling of being	266
MATTHEW RATCLIFFE	
VOLUME III MORALITY, AESTHETICS AND THE EMOTIONS	
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
Introduction	1
ANGELIKA KREBS	

PART 9	
Morality and the emotions	23
31 Freedom and resentment	25
P. F. STRAWSON	
32 Morality and the emotions	45
BERNARD WILLIAMS	
33 The conscience of Huckleberry Finn	64
JONATHAN BENNETT	
34 The tyranny of principles	76
STEPHEN TOULMIN	
35 Human rights, rationality, and sentimentality	93
RICHARD RORTY	
36 Can revenge be just or otherwise justified?	110
GILEAD BAR-ELLI AND DAVID HEYD	
37 Forgiveness: overcoming justified resentment	124
AVISHAI MARGALIT	
38 Sentimentality	136
MICHAEL TANNER	
PART 10	
Aesthetics and the emotions	151
39 Emotion in response to art	153
JERROLD LEVINSON	
40 Content	168
ROGER SCRUTON	
41 Correspondence, projective properties, and expression in the arts	192
RICHARD WOLLHEIM	

- 42 On being moved by architecture** 205
JENEFER ROBINSON
- 43 'As if the earth has long stopped speaking to us': resonance with nature and its loss** 231
ANGELIKA KREBS
- 44 The emotional experience of the sublime** 267
TOM COCHRANE
- 45 Catharsis** 287
JONATHAN LEAR
- 46 The avoidance of love: a reading of *King Lear*** 313
STANLEY CAVELL
- 47 Violence and the media** 320
MICHAEL HANEKE

VOLUME IV SPECIFIC EMOTIONS

- Acknowledgements* vii
- Introduction** 1
AARON BEN-ZE'EV
- PART 11**
Love, sexual desire and friendship 27
- 48 Love's bond** 29
ROBERT NOZICK
- 49 The ambiguity of love and Phenomenology of eros** 43
EMMANUEL LÉVINAS
- 50 Insatiable desire** 53
FIONA ELLIS
- 51 Faux friendship** 72
WILLIAM DERESIEWICZ

- PART 12**
Other positive emotions 83
- 52 The art of good hope** 85
VICTORIA McGEER
- 53 Trust as an affective attitude** 115
KAREN JONES
- 54 Pride and humility** 135
GABRIELE TAYLOR
- 55 Gratitude and obligation** 155
CLAUDIA CARD
- 56 Polemics and schadenfreude** 172
ANDREAS DORSCHER
- PART 13**
Negative emotions 179
- 57 The standard modes of aversion: fear, disgust and hatred** 181
AUREL KOLNAI
- 58 Fearing death** 194
AMÉLIE OKSEBERG RORTY
- 59 Envy in social life** 207
JON ELSTER
- 60 Jealousy** 221
DANIEL M. FARRELL
- 61 The inability to mourn** 237
ALEXANDER MITSCHERLICH AND MARGARETE MITSCHERLICH
- 62 Remorse and agent-regret** 251
MARCIA BARON

PART 14	
Moods	277
63 How much home does a person need?	279
JEAN AMÉRY	
64 Boring from within: endogenous versus reactive boredom	295
JEROME NEU	
<i>Index</i>	309

PREFACE

Emotions are “what make us tick.” Understanding emotions is the key to understanding people. Yet, philosophy is not love of people but love of wisdom, and traditionally emotions have been regarded as obstacles to wisdom, it was thought that reason must master the passions. Only recently, around the beginning of the new millennium, has philosophy stepped out of the shadow cast by the master/slave metaphor and put emotions center stage.

This four-volume edition gathers the fruits of the emotional turn in philosophy (with the first articles selected being from the middle of the last century). The *first* volume presents major answers currently given to the question: *what is an emotion?* It features theories that understand emotions mainly as feelings, as forms of action-readiness, as perceptions or judgments of value, and as dynamic or narrative wholes with many different interlocking components.

Specific emotions, such as romantic love, disgust, or pride, are analyzed in the *fourth* and last volume.

The second and third volumes occupy the middle ground in that they are less concrete than the last volume, but more concrete than the first. The *third* volume focuses on the role emotions play in *morality* and *aesthetics* and the *second* volume on their role in a *happy and meaningful life*. The latter volume discusses, among other things, how and to what end emotions are *regulated* and whether or not they can be *shared*. As *moods* are of primary relevance for the quality of our life, a whole section of the second volume is dedicated to the as-yet-understudied category of moods.

In compiling these four volumes, which consist of over 60 articles, we have tried to look beyond the “Tellerrand” of mainstream analytical philosophy and included not only articles from continental philosophy, but also from other academic disciplines such as psychology and sociology, and even from beyond academia, for example, from psychotherapy, literature, and film. Another of our concerns has been to give women authors a prominent place. Although emotions are often assigned to women, who in consequence might know more about them than men, women have been underrepresented in theoretical studies in this field.

Chronological table continued

Date	Author(s)	Title	Source	Vol.	Chapter
2013	Fiona Ellis	Insatiable desire	<i>Philosophy</i> 88: 243–265.	IV	50
2014	Margaret Gilbert	How we feel: understanding everyday collective emotion ascription	C. von Scheve and M. Salmela (eds.), <i>Collective Emotions</i> , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 17–31.	II	23
2015	Andreas Dorschel	Polemics and schadenfreude	2017; revised version of 'Passions of the intellect: a study of polemics', <i>Philosophy</i> 90: 679–684.	IV	56
2017	Angelika Krebs	'As if the earth has long stopped speaking to us': resonance with nature and its loss	Unpublished.	III	43
2017	Avishai Margalit	Forgiveness: overcoming justified resentment	Unpublished.	III	37

INTRODUCTION

Aaron Ben-Ze'ev

For every complex problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong.

(H. L. Mencken)

Emotions play a central role in our lives and are of vital interest to us all. Although emotions accompany almost every significant event in our lives, the nature, causes, and consequences of emotions are among the least understood aspects of human experience. It is easy to feel emotions, but difficult to describe them and even harder to understand them. Despite their apparent familiarity, emotions are exceptionally subtle and complex experiences; accordingly, the conceptual tools used to gain a better understanding of emotions need to be flexible, employing categories such as the prototypical category, rather than rigid and clear-cut definitions. Like other complex experiences, emotional experiences consist of many different and connected components. It is often assumed that the major emotional components are:

- 1 *cognition*: which in the narrow sense consists merely of acquiring *information* about the given circumstances;
- 2 *evaluation*: which involves an *assessment* of the *personal significance* of this information;
- 3 *motivation*: which addresses our desires, or *readiness to act*, in the given circumstances;
- 4 *feeling*: which is a phenomenal *awareness* of our own *body*.

These components are not separate entities; emotions do not entail the performance of four distinct activities: knowing, evaluating, desiring, and feeling. In other words, the distinction is not empirical, but conceptual; the four components constitute different aspects of typical emotional experiences.

Theoretical approaches to emotions have been traditionally divided into:

- *cognitivist* theories
- *feeling* theories.

Cognitivist theories consider emotions to consist mainly of complex thoughts or thought-like processes. They can be further differentiated into those emphasizing

the *informative*, the *evaluative*, or the *motivational* aspects. Another view within the family of cognitivist theories is the perceptual view, which treats emotion as a kind of perception. *Feeling* theories of emotions focus on less complex mental capacities, such as sensation and feeling.¹

The use of the term "cognition" in both philosophy and psychology is confusing. In its narrow sense, the term refers merely to acquiring information or knowledge; in its wider sense, it also includes other intentional capacities, such as evaluation and motivation. If we take the narrow definition of cognition as acquiring knowledge, then evaluation is, strictly speaking, not cognition, while feeling can be so considered. Another ambiguity in the term "cognition" is that it can refer to both the informational content and the mechanism generating this content. In the latter sense it often denotes the computational mechanism assumed to underlie mental states.

Leaving aside these ambiguities, we can nevertheless discern a *continuum* of greater or lesser developed mental capacities, with the capacity to feel the *sensations* of pleasure and pain at the lower end of the spectrum. In the middle area of this spectrum are the *perceptual* capacity that acquires information about our given environment, *memory* that provides information about the past, and *imagination* that refers to the future and the possible. Finally, at the other end is the capacity to *think* in a way that judges and connects all these types of knowledge in a meaningful manner. Cognitivist conceptions of emotions focus on this upper end, emphasizing, for example, the role of evaluative judgments in emotions, whereas feeling conceptions focus on the lower end, stressing the role of bodily feeling.

It seems that capacities from the whole spectrum are present in emotional experiences; however, what is disputable is:

- the *constitutive* or *accidental* nature of the given capacities in emotional experiences;
- the nature of the *mechanism* generating emotional experiences.

Regarding the first issue, the cognitivist and feeling theories differ over whether thoughts (e.g., evaluative judgments) or bodily feelings are the *only* constitutive components of emotions. The dispute on the nature of the mechanism generating emotions is whether the mechanism is an intellectual-like process or an intuitive ability. It is probably the case that in different circumstances both types of *mechanism* are at work in emotions.

Theories of emotions often focus upon one component only, thereby treating it as the essence of emotional experience. However, in light of its complexity, simplistic accounts that reduce emotional experience to one component only are bound to run into difficulties. It appears that most philosophers, when presenting their own theories, are aware of this complexity, though they sometimes rank their preferred component as more essential; yet, this complexity becomes less apparent when these theories are discussed by their opponents.

The prevailing approach to emotions is the *cognitivist-evaluative* approach, originating in Aristotle and the Stoics. In this volume, different versions of this approach, which is also known as "appraisal theory," are to be found in the articles by Robert M. Gordon, Martha Nussbaum, Robert C. Roberts, Robert C. Solomon, Charles Taylor, and Aaron Ben-Ze'ev. The *motivational* view is represented by Nico H. Frijda, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.² A cognitivist view that is restricted to the information aspect is rare. The currently popular view of emotions as *perceptions of value*, which is put forward in this volume by Christine Tappolet and Robert C. Roberts, can perhaps be classified as cognitivist because perception is basically the cognitive capacity of acquiring information. However, as the information acquired concerns value, it would be odd to classify it as a cognitivist view. Moreover, the emphasis in perception theories is on the difference between perception and judgment and not on the dissimilarity between perception and evaluation.

The major opponent of the cognitivist-evaluative approach is the *feeling* conception of emotions, which was presented by René Descartes, John Locke, and David Hume, and further developed by William James, who famously argued that emotions are nothing but the feelings of bodily changes. A version of this approach is presented in this volume by Jesse Prinz. Hermann Schmitz's article also seems to show some affinity to the feeling theory. Each of the above approaches has various versions that range from strong ones, in which emotions are *identified* with one of their constitutive components, to weaker ones, in which the given component is regarded as a necessary but *not a sufficient condition* for emotional experience.

For example, with regard to the cognitivist-evaluative approach, both Martha Nussbaum and Robert C. Solomon identify emotions with evaluative thoughts. However, they and others still differ on the two following issues:

- the *presence* of the evaluation: (a) only in the emotional *experience*, or (b) also in the *cause* generating the emotion;
- the *status* of the evaluation: (a) only an implied appreciation, or (b) an actual judgment.

Weaker versions of the cognitivist-evaluative approach sometimes reject not merely the identification of an emotion with an evaluative thought, but also the necessity of the two second claims in both issues; that is, they reject the assumptions that the evaluative component must be present in the emotional cause and that it involves an actual judgment. Although strong versions seem to be more consistent, as they constitute "pure" belief, they are harder to defend. The great sensitivity of emotions to personal and contextual circumstances calls for a nuanced appreciation of the roles that different components play in diverse circumstances; the significant complexity of emotions makes the reduction of emotions to only one of the components implausible.

Given the difficulties of the strong single-component versions, various scholars have tried to *integrate* a few major components into one coherent idea.

A few such examples are Helm's notion of evaluative feelings; Roberts' concept of concern-based construal, which tries to combine the cognitive, evaluative, and motivational aspects; and Prinz's notion of embodied appraisals, which means to cover the cognitive, evaluative, and feeling aspects. Views like these have the advantage of being more sensitive to emotional complexity, but they run the risk of being accused of inconsistency or lack of clarity.

Historical and systematic surveys

Robert C. Solomon (1942–2007), from the University of Texas at Austin, is one of the founding fathers of the contemporary philosophy of emotions. As he has written many books and edited essential collections on the emotions, he seems best suited to give a historical and also systematic survey of it, as he does in his 2008 article "The philosophy of emotions."

Solomon argues that one of the most enduring metaphors in the history of philosophy has been the *metaphor of master and slave*—reason as the master that should control the dangerous emotions of the slave, trying to bring them into harmony with reason. The master–slave metaphor implies not only that emotions are inferior to reason, but also that the conflict between reason and the emotions is a conflict of two natural kinds. Solomon claims that most philosophers, however, have sought a more moderate position.

As he explains, both Aristotle and the Stoics take emotions to involve a kind of judgment. But whereas Aristotle regards emotions as essential to the good life, the Stoics see them as fostering misery. Descartes also considers emotions to be disturbing, emphasizing the central place of physiological agitation and feeling in emotion. Hume, with his famous claim that reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, continues this tradition while still acknowledging the important instrumental role of reason. Kant clearly opposes Hume's skepticism about reason and any attempt to replace reason with irrational faith or fleeting feeling. In the last century, phenomenologists, such as Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, and Paul Ricœur, gave a central place to emotions in human existence. A counter view is that of logical positivism, which regards ethical statements as meaningless since they are seen as nothing but expressions of emotion.

In his survey, Solomon only hints at his own position, which he develops in many books and articles. Of great relevance are his books *The Passions* (1993) and *True to our Feelings* (2007). In his 2004 article, "Emotions, thoughts, and feelings," Solomon summarizes his mature view of emotions. He still affirms his earlier slogan, "Emotions are judgments," but understands emotions as very complex judgments. In other words, Solomon does not believe anymore that emotions are *nothing but* judgments or that judgments must be deliberative, articulate, or fully conscious. He still characterizes emotions as cognitive, though noting that "cognition" is a not very informative technical term, or, in its broad sense, is too vague, ambiguous, and confusing. Among the notions that have been considered to be at the core of the cognitivist theory of emotions, namely,

intentionality, belief, thought, judgment, seeing as, construal, and perception, Solomon regards a flexible notion of *judgment* as most suitable, because it can accommodate the other notions. In rethinking his longstanding view, he suspects that in his pursuit of an alternative to the feeling theory he went too far in the other direction and his judgment theory was cut too thin; he now believes that bodily feelings are more important. He suggests that *judgments of the body*, understood non-mysteriously as knowing-how cognitions, are manifest in feelings. In this sense, feelings are cognitive too, being profound expressions of our many ways of engaging with the world.

Charles Taylor (*1931), from McGill University in Montreal, is known for his enquiry into the modern self. His work is remarkable in range and depth. He is often described as bridging the gap between the analytic and continental styles of philosophy, having been influenced by Heidegger and Gadamer, and having studied and taught at Oxford. He is the winner of the prestigious Kyoto prize in 2000. Among his many books, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (1989) and *The Ethics of Authenticity* (1991) are probably the most influential.

In his 1985 article "The concept of a person," Taylor looks at the emotions from the perspective of personhood. He distinguishes between two views of personhood: the *representation* and the *significance* view. The first view considers persons to be beings with consciousness, where consciousness is seen as the power to frame representations of things. What makes it possible to attribute a point of view to people is that they have a representation of how things are. This view takes as relatively unproblematic the nature of agency—agents are identified by a performance criterion: animals perform better than machines, and humans perform better than animals.

The second view, advocated by Taylor himself, focuses on the nature of agency—what is crucial about agents is that things *matter* to them; hence, we can attribute purposes, desires, and aversions to agents. He argues that an agent is essentially a subject of *significance*, and many of the things that matter to human beings surely have no equivalent in animals. The capacity to recognize and be reflexively aware of standards or norms is one example of this. Unlike in the representation view, according to which being human basically means to plan and perform, in Taylor's view being human is contingent on being open to certain matters of significance, having a sense of self and of one's life, and the ability to evaluate and make choices.

Taylor's view of personhood fits well with the cognitivist-evaluative position on emotions. Characterizing a person as a subject of significance who is sensitive to certain standards is tantamount to emphasizing the essential role of evaluative thought in emotions.³ Indeed, Taylor writes that one could say that there is a kind of judgment integral to each emotion, but this does not negate the role of other components.

Robert C. Roberts (*1942), from the Institute for Studies of Religion at Baylor University, Texas, works in the fields of ethics (especially virtues), Kierkegaard, emotion, moral psychology, and epistemology. He is the author of

a three-volume opus on the moral psychology of emotions, of which *Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology* (2003) is the first, *Emotions in the Moral Life* (2013) the second, and *Attention to Virtues*, the third is still in progress.

In his 2009 article, “The sophistication of non-human emotion,” Roberts considers human emotions as *concern-based construals*. These construals, which are akin to perceptions, are structured by a synthetic unity of “factual” and “evaluative” attributions; hence, the character of emotional situations is both “descriptive” and “evaluative.” Construals make sense of the object; they present it in a certain manner.

Roberts applies his approach to the difficult issue of animal emotions, claiming that the difference between human and animal emotions is largely a matter of degree of sophistication. In fact he claims that non-human animals exhibit a surprising degree of sophistication in various dimensions.

In general, Roberts distinguishes eight dimensions of emotional sophistication:

- 1 The object of an emotion is typically a *situation*: Many mammals have the power of situation perception concerning things about which they care.
- 2 Emotions can occur in the *absence of the object*: The absence of language limits the ability of animals to have an emotion in the absence of the object; however, higher animals can exhibit episodes of hope and grief, which relate to absent objects.
- 3 Emotions can occur in response to a complex *narrative*: Animals are unable to tell stories and thus have less access to historical aspects, which make human emotions so rich and deep; yet many animals have memories that enter their emotional experiences.
- 4 Emotions can be *felt*: The weakness of animals’ power of second-order consciousness does not imply that they lack phenomenal consciousness of their emotions.
- 5 Emotions can be *dissented from*: Animals lack the power of thought and cannot dissent from their emotions.
- 6 Emotional dispositions are *plastic*: The ability to learn certain emotional dispositions is widely distributed in the animal kingdom; thus, wild animals that have benign contact with humans can learn to be relatively fearless of close approach.
- 7 Adult human emotions can be *reflexive* in being (a) about their subject, and (b) about an emotion of their subject; such reflexivity requires the capacity to think about emotion-types which is not present in non-human animals.
- 8 Emotions can be *about other people’s mental states*: animals lack reflection and rumination detached from the perceivable immediacy of the situation; since they also lack the power of complex language and explicit thinking, such complex emotions are likely to be absent in the animal kingdom.

Roberts argues that non-human animals may have *concepts* but not *thoughts*, as he puts it. Whoever has a concept has the ability to *discriminate* between and

recognize things in terms of their functions and relations to the self and to other things; thus, many animals can distinguish hostile from friendly behavior; they do have a rich emotional life.⁴ *Thinking* is more complex; it is a *language-dependent* ability to understand the world. In Roberts’ view, the ability to make concern-based construals does not depend on thinking.

Roberts resolutely rejects the view that emotions *are* judgments; he agrees, however, that one aspect of judgment, which also exists in animals, is readiness to act. The concepts used in non-human animals are deployed only, or almost only, in perception and behavior, not in reflection and rumination, which are part of human emotion.

Theories of emotions

Martha Nussbaum (*1947), who is arguably the most prominent female philosopher of our time, is a Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago. She has published extensively on a large variety of topics including emotions in general and particular emotions, such as love, sexual desire, disgust, shame, and anger. Some of her greatest books are *The Fragility of Goodness* (1986), *Sex and Social Justice* (1998), *Political Emotions* (2013), *Anger and Forgiveness* (2016). She is the winner of the 2016 prestigious Kyoto prize.

Nussbaum’s article “Emotions as judgments of value and importance,” is an early version of chapter 1 in Nussbaum’s 2001 book *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. As she makes clear in that book, the first chapter is a sketch that must be elaborated and, crucially, modified by later chapters. She argues in the book that we must give up the focus on judgments in order to make room for a broader class of evaluative perceptions, in order to do justice to the emotions of children and other animals; we must include cultural variation in our account; and we must provide a developmental account of emotions, showing how the emotions of a mature adult have their roots in, and are shadowed by, infantile emotions. Finally, by studying the emotional dimensions of music, we must give up the single-minded emphasis on language that characterizes the Stoic account.

Nussbaum starts her 2004 article “Emotions as judgments of value and importance” with a moving account of her feelings upon her mother’s death. Like Solomon and Taylor, Nussbaum emphasizes personal significance, arguing that the object of an emotion must be seen as *important* for the person’s own life. The story of an emotion, she argues, is the story of judgments about important things.

Nussbaum posits five major characteristics of emotions:

- 1 Emotions are *about* something: they have an object.
- 2 The object is an *intentional* object: that is, it figures in the emotion as it is seen or interpreted by the person whose emotion it is.
- 3 These emotions embody not simply ways of seeing an object, but *beliefs*—often very complex—about the object.

- 4 Emotions are all concerned with *value*: they see their object as invested with personal importance; emotions are *eudaimonistic* in that they are concerned with the agent's flourishing.
- 5 Emotions are not only perceptions, but also judgments of value; they take a stance on how things appear.

Naussbaum advocates a complex version of the cognitivist-evaluative approach to emotions.

Robert M. Gordon (*1932), from the University of Missouri, St. Louis, is one of the pioneer cognitivists about emotions. One of his other research interests is simulation theory, which holds that we understand other human beings by mentally simulating them.

Gordon's view on emotions is presented in his influential book, *The Structure of Emotions* (1987), from which the second chapter, "Pivotal distinctions," is included in this collection. Gordon draws a distinction between *epistemic* and *factive* emotions. He proposes this as an alternative to the traditional distinction between forward-looking and backward-looking emotions, since he believes that no emotion can be distinguished merely by its temporal structure. What he finds more important is whether the emotional event is certain, which makes it a factive emotion, or uncertain, ergo epistemic. In epistemic emotions, such as fear or hope, the nature of the emotion itself defeats the assumption of factivity.

Gordon further differentiates between wanting, desiring, and wishing; he notes the uniqueness of wishing in determining the nature of emotions and suggests why emotions can be ambivalent and irrational. As an example, Gordon cites a colleague who wished to be monogamously married to several women at once. Gordon also claims that the distinction between negative and positive emotions should not be based on the pleasant/unpleasant or the attractive/aversive divide, but rather on the negative or positive *attitude* towards something. This might imply a cognitivist-evaluative view, but not a strong one as Gordon rejects the presence of actual judgments.

Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (*1949), from the University of Haifa in Israel, whose doctoral advisor at the University of Chicago was Stephen Toulmin, has written widely on the philosophy of mind, perception, and the emotions, and in particular on *romantic love*. His case study *In the Name of Love* (2008), co-authored with Ruhama Goussinsky, concerns men who have murdered their wives or partners allegedly "out of love." In his major book, *The Subtlety of Emotions* (2000), he deals with issues that are basic to the theory of emotions and offers an analysis of all major specific emotions.

His article, "The thing called emotion: a subtle perspective," summarizes his overall view of emotions. It discusses them by examining their nature and then comparing them to other phenomena. It divides all emotional experiences into acute, extended, and enduring ones. *Acute* emotions are brief, almost instantaneous occurrent experiences that lack frequency and development. *Extended* emotions involve successive repetitions of occurrent experiences that are felt to

belong to the same emotion. *Enduring* emotions are the longest lasting and can persist for many years. In addition to their duration and frequency, enduring emotions involve meaningful development.

Ben-Ze'ev begins his account of emotions by examining the nature of typical acute emotions. These emotions are generated when we perceive a positive or negative significant *change* in our personal situation; their focus is a *comparative personal concern*, and their major characteristics are *instability*, *great intensity*, *partiality*, and *brief duration*.

He considers the basic *components* of emotions to be *cognition*, *evaluation*, *motivation*, and *feeling* and argues that the evaluative component is central in distinguishing between the various emotions, while for the nature of emotions in general the other components are essential as well. He also emphasizes the importance of recognizing the regularities underlying emotional *intensity*. In this regard, he discerns two major groups of intensity variables: those referring to the perceived impact of the event eliciting the emotional state and those dealing with the background circumstances of the agents involved in the emotional state. Ben-Ze'ev also compares emotions to *other affective experiences* such as moods, affective traits, and affective disorders. Moreover, he relates the whole affective mode, and in particular the emotional one, to other *mental modes*, such as perception and thinking.

Hermann Schmitz (*1928), from Kiel University in Germany, develops, what he calls a New Phenomenology, in his ten-volume *System of Philosophy* (1964–1980). His leading intuition is that we exist fundamentally as a body, and it is the body that is essential to any understanding of ourselves and of everything else.

In his 2011 article "Emotions outside the box: the new phenomenology of feeling and corporeality," he applies his general view to the issue of emotions. His position, which emphasizes sensibility towards the nuanced realities of lived bodily experience, runs counter to the old intellectualist tradition (represented by Plato and Aristotle) that assumes the existence of the mind as a private, inner realm of subjective experience.

Schmitz holds that emotions are atmospheres poured out spatially that move the felt body. Schmitz provides a few examples to clarify this seemingly mystical view. Thus, the mood of a scoundrel or a wretch can, to their own surprise, be changed to become more peaceful or even piteous by the atmosphere of a church. Or sensitive persons feeling joy will curb their expression of joy, for example, by falling silent, if they unexpectedly encounter a group of grief-stricken people.

Jesse Prinz, from the City University of New York, is an expert on the philosophy of psychology and ethics, and in particular on the role of perception, emotion, and culture in human thought and values. Among his various books are *Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion* (2004) and *The Emotional Construction of Morals* (2007).

In his 2004 article "Embodied emotions," he defends a modified version of the James-Lange feeling theory of emotions according to which emotions are

nothing but perceptions of bodily changes. To support this position, Prinz reviews the various pros and cons of the James-Lange theory. One major objection to this theory is that it cannot explain the intentionality or rationality of emotions. In answering this objection, Prinz proposes that emotions can “represent” core relational themes (such as danger) even if they are only perceptions of bodily states. To show how, he inserts the causal theory of representation which holds that a mental state derives its intentional content by virtue of being reliably caused by something. If emotions are perceptions of bodily states, which are reliably caused by changes in the body, which in turn are reliably caused by the instantiations of core relational themes, then the perceptions of the bodily states also represent those themes. The bodily changes that evoke the emotional response belong, in his view, to mental *elicitation files* that trigger an emotional response. Through evolution and personal development, these files have been established, but new files can be created all the time, adding new triggering conditions to existing files. The elicitation files are not emotions in themselves; rather, they are triggers underlying the generation of emotions.

If we consider the continuum of complexity of mental capacities, beginning with bodily feeling and ending in evaluative judgment, we may say that Nussbaum and Prinz are at the opposite ends of this continuum. Nussbaum focuses on the upper level of the continuum, asserting not only that the judgments described are necessary constituent elements of the emotion, but that they are sufficient as well, while Prinz stresses the lower level, arguing that emotions are exhausted by the perceptions of bodily changes.

Bennett W. Helm (*1966), from Franklin and Marshall College in Pennsylvania, has published widely on the philosophy of mind, moral psychology, and the emotions. As he himself puts it, his primary interest has always been to find a solution to the mind-body problem that is adequate as a serious moral psychology. Among his books are *Emotional Reason* (2007) and *Love, Friendship, and the Self* (2010).

In his 2009 article “Emotions as evaluative feelings,” Helm stresses the importance of the evaluative component in emotions, arguing that to be an *agent* is to be a subject of “import.” Despite this similarity to traditional cognitivist-evaluative views, he advocates abandoning standard philosophical accounts of emotion, since they fail to appreciate the feeling of import—mainly because they focus overly on intentionality and computation. Helm’s criticism of the computational approach is reminiscent of Taylor’s criticism of the representational view.

We may point out in this regard that the term *feeling* is used in diverse ways both in everyday language and in philosophy. In common practice, people use the verb “to feel” widely, applying it to a broad range of affective states, whereas in philosophy the noun “feeling” is often used in a narrower sense. Helm seems to use the noun as widely as the verb. In this case, however, we would need another term for describing the difference between intentional states such as emotions, thoughts, and memories, and bodily feelings such as toothache. Otherwise, it becomes difficult to understand Helm’s assertion that emotions are pleasures or

pains in that they are feelings of import impressing themselves on us. Helm correctly claims that emotions are neither cognitions nor motivations; emotions might involve cognitive, motivational, and evaluative aspects, but the whole experience is not one of merely cognition, motivation, or evaluation. However, for similar reasons, emotions cannot be considered as mere feelings, such as pleasure and pain. The notion of “evaluative feeling” is intriguing, but clarifying the distinction between emotions and feelings is crucial for its plausibility.

Nico H. Frijda (1927–2015), was a Professor of Psychology at the University of Amsterdam. Having survived the Holocaust, he devoted his life to the study of emotions, becoming arguably the central figure in the *psychology* of emotions. Yet his impact on the philosophy of emotions has also been substantial. His most comprehensive and influential book, *The Emotions* (1987), presents his model of emotions, which holds that they are states of action readiness.⁵

In his 1988 article “The laws of emotion,” he formulates a set of empirical regularities for emotional behavior. He expands on this in his 2007 book of the same title. All in all, Frijda proposes nine laws or families of laws of emotion:

- 1 *The law of situational meaning*: Emotions arise in response to the meaning structures of given situations; different emotions arise in response to different meaning structures.
- 2 *The law of concern*: Emotions arise in response to events that are important to the individual’s goals, motives, or concerns.
- 3 *The law of apparent reality*: Emotions are elicited by events appraised as real, and their intensity corresponds to the degree to which this is the case.
- 4 *The law of change*: Emotions are elicited not so much by the presence of favorable or unfavorable conditions, but by actual or expected changes in favorable or unfavorable conditions.
- 5 *The law of hedonic asymmetry*: Pleasure is always contingent upon change and disappears with continuous satisfaction. Pain may persist under continuing adverse conditions.
- 6 *The law of conservation of emotional momentum*: Emotional events retain their power to elicit emotions indefinitely, unless counteracted by repetitive exposures that permit extinction or habituation, to the extent that these are possible.
- 7 *The law of closure*: Emotions tend to be closed to judgments of relativity of impact and to the requirements of goals other than their own.
- 8 *The law of care for consequence*: Every emotional impulse elicits a secondary impulse that tends to modify it in view of its possible consequences.
- 9 *The law of the lightest load and the greatest gain*: Whenever a situation can be viewed in alternative ways, a tendency exists to view it in a way that minimizes negative emotional load and maximizes emotional gain.

The law that Frijda considers to be the essential feature of emotions, its distinguishing mark, is *the law of closure*. This law indicates that people tend to

perceive their emotional judgments in a very personal and absolute manner. Frijda cites several vivid examples of this. For someone who is truly angry, the thing that happened is felt to be absolutely bad; it is not merely a disgraceful act but one that flows from the actor's very nature and disposition; somebody who has acted so disgracefully *is* disgraceful and thus will always be. In strong grief, the person feels that life is devoid of meaning, that life cannot go on without the one lost. Each time one falls in love, one feels as if one has never felt like that before; one dies a thousand deaths without the other. In discussing this law in his later book, *The Laws of Emotions*, Frijda distinguishes two types of closure (or partiality), arguing that emotions are closed not because they are impenetrable to any type of information, after all, lovers are not completely blind, but because they are impenetrable to information that is irrelevant to, or incompatible with, their personal aims.⁶

Another significant law is the *law of apparent reality*. Events can be perceived as real, even though they do not physically or actually exist. Frijda discusses the *vividness effect*, according to which symbolic information generally has weak impact in comparison to the impact of pictures and of events actually seen. A photograph of one distressed child has more emotional effect than reports about thousands killed; this is an exemplification of the saying that a picture is worth a thousand words. Such a view may explain why we are moved by novels and movies despite their fictional nature: The former are more vivid than a factual informative description about an incident in a remote place.

The law of change indicates the crucial role of change in generating emotions and the fact that emotional intensity diminishes with time. To a large extent, this law is based on the law of habituation: continued pleasures wear off; continued hardships lose their poignancy. Daily life offers ample illustrations of this, some of which are consoling, others saddening. The pains of lost love abate with time, but love itself gradually loses its magic. Continued exposure to inhumanities blunts both suffering and moral discernment.

Frijda emphasizes the *complexity* of emotions, indicating that emotions are subjective experiences at the core of which lies the experience of pleasure or pain, which in turn is embedded in the outcome of appraisal and is connected to forms of action readiness. He tends to consider *action readiness* as the most significant aspect. Although Frijda's view can be classified as motivational, it is so in a weak sense, as it takes into account other components as well.

Keith Oatley (*1939) is an Anglo-Canadian novelist and Professor of Psychology from the University of Toronto; he is the second psychologist to be represented in this collection. His research interests are wide, including the study of emotion, motivation, visual perception, artificial intelligence, human-computer interaction, and psychology of fiction. His major book on emotions is *Best Laid Schemes: The Psychology of the Emotions* (1992). He is the author of three novels, the first of these—in which Sigmund Freud and Sherlock Holmes work on the same case—is *The Case of Emily V* (1994). Oatley also reviews movies for *PsycCritiques*.

In his 2010 article "Two movements in emotions: communication and reflection," Oatley focuses on two major types of emotional "movement" already discerned by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus. The first is an involuntary brief reaction; the second involves thinking and choice, and extends over time. Chrysippus considers the second movement to be the real emotion. In contrast, the psychologist Paul Ekman believes that emotions last only a matter of seconds.⁷ Oatley sides with Chrysippus in assuming that emotions can endure for days or even longer. Ekman may be correct, Oatley holds, concerning the first movement only, but Chrysippus is right regarding the second movement. As Oatley sees it, the function of the first movement is communication to ourselves and others, and putting the system into a state of action readiness; the second movement seems to prompt consideration and action, initially in a directed and local way, but then perhaps opening up to a wider context. The first movement is informative, indicating that something has occurred that affects our goals. Although this automatic emotional system commands our attention and sets off our readiness, it does not always indicate what has happened, or how it is to be understood. It is more a call for attention or a warning, like an alarm going off in a house. The second movement, or "reappraisal," can include an understanding of the emotion's implications for our daily life.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1952) is one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. His two masterpieces, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921) and *Philosophical Investigations* (1967), have had an enormous influence that has spread far beyond philosophy and even academic life in general. He famously ended his hardworking life with the words: "Tell them I've had a wonderful life."

This volume features a string of brief insightful remarks from his collection of observations, *Zettel* ("slips"). One example is: "Love is not a feeling. Love is put to the test, pain not. One does not say: 'That was not true pain, or it would not have gone off so quickly.'" In this short note, some of Wittgenstein's basic characterizations of emotions can be found—for instance, that emotions have genuine duration and involve certain activities. It would sound peculiar, he notes elsewhere, to say that one felt deep grief for a second.⁸ Yet, it does not sound peculiar to say that a feeling, such as pain, lasts a few seconds. At least some emotions, such as love and hate, might thus be called dispositional and have a much longer duration. Hence, they have "a course" and we can put them to the test; passing this test is a kind of achievement. This achievement also implies the presence of a normative standard and activities intended to fulfill this norm which fits with the fact that we do not speak about the bodily place of emotions, as we do concerning feelings. The stark difference between feelings (or sensations) and emotions renders implausible William James' claim that the feeling of bodily changes is an emotion. Sensations and emotions can have common expressive behavior, such as facial expression, but this does not make them identical.

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), a French philosopher, novelist, and political activist, is one of the most original thinkers in existentialism, phenomenology,

and Marxism. In 1964, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature but refused it, saying that he always declined official honors and that a writer should not allow himself to be turned into an institution.

In his 1939 *Sketch for a Theory of Emotions*, the third part of which “Outline of a phenomenological theory” (and the conclusion) are reprinted here, Sartre characterizes emotion as a specific way in which consciousness apprehends the world around us. Emotions are *transformations* of the world. Sartre criticizes James’ theory, which reduces emotions to pure feeling. An emotion in Sartre’s view has meaning; yet there is an indissoluble synthesis of the emotional subject and object, with the object being something that demands to be freely created. In this sense, emotion is “used up” in constituting the object. Sartre considers emotion to be evasive. When we become emotional, we engage in a kind of *magical thinking* that arises because the world has become too much for us and we need some excuses and escape devices to distract ourselves from the responsibility for our lives. Sartre seems to assume that all emotions are formed in this deviant way.

In order to illustrate his view on emotions, Sartre uses Aesop’s famous fable about the hungry fox who wants to taste the delicious-looking grapes that hang above him; he jumps and jumps but is unable to reach them. Eventually, he gives up, saying: “I thought those grapes were ripe, but now I see they are sour.” In La Fontaine’s slightly modified version, the fox says that the grapes are too green, although less discriminating folk might like to try them. Sartre believes that the fable shows how consciousness alleviates the frustrations associated with failure. Jon Elster suggests that the fable indicates that opportunities shape desires by way of what he calls “adaptive preference formation.” Yet, Elster does not think that the fox’s behavior is the norm; sometimes people desire something precisely because they cannot have it, as “forbidden fruit is sweet.”⁹

Sartre’s key idea is that emotions are generated in the face of difficulties. He, of course, does not deny the presence of positive emotions such as joy, which seem not to have anything to do with difficulties. However, due to his metaphysical assumption concerning our inability to tolerate not merely frustration but satisfaction as well, he nevertheless believes that such emotions also result from difficulties.¹⁰

Emotions and rationality

Ronald de Sousa (*1940), from the University of Toronto, is the leading person in the debate on the rationality of emotions, an issue he addresses in his groundbreaking book, *The Rationality of Emotions* (1987). In this book, he refutes the idea that reason and emotion are natural antagonists. For him, emotions are a kind of perception; their roots lie in the *paradigm scenarios* in which they are learned, and they play a crucial role in rational beliefs, desires, and decisions by breaking the deadlocks of pure reason.

In his 2007 article “Truth, authenticity, and rationality,” de Sousa suggests that emotions are Janus-faced, telling us something about the world and about ourselves. Accordingly, we might discern two kinds of truth in emotions; one is about the self and the other about the world. The two faces of emotion relate to the apparent paradox concerning the subject’s role in shaping the emotional content and the objective truth value of emotions. There appear to be two seemingly conflicting facts: (1) emotions are perceived as passive states that tell us something about the world, and hence emotions can be mistaken, and (2) emotions are active, as our understanding of the world is constitutive of the emotions, and hence they cannot be mistaken or irrational. Both de Sousa and Taylor discuss this apparent paradox and both seem to offer a similar solution: We cannot be mistaken in the way we sincerely describe our feelings, but we can be mistaken concerning our emotions, which are more than just feelings. De Sousa further argues that feelings have *compatibility conditions*: one might feel both hungry and cold, or hungry and warm but one can not feel both hot and cold in the same respect at the same time. In emotions, in turn, we can speak about *consistency through time*.

Patricia S. Greenspan (*1944), from the University of Maryland, College Park, is another pioneering philosopher in the contemporary study of emotions, in particular, in the field of the rationality and morality of emotions. Greenspan’s main areas of research are moral philosophy, moral psychology, and philosophy of action. Her major book is *Emotions and Reasons* (1988).

In her insightful article, “A case of mixed feelings: ambivalence and the logic of emotion” (1980), Greenspan rejects two common assumptions: (1) the identification of ambivalence with irrationality, and (2) the identification of emotions with judgments. Basing her argument against (1) on Spinoza, Greenspan claims that in certain circumstances ambivalence can occur in a basically rational person. Concerning (2), she believes that albeit emotions generally correspond to judgments, they also seem to exhibit a *logic of their own*. Emotions are assessed by their appropriateness in the given circumstances, and not necessarily by the agent’s overall body of evidence. Whereas two contrary judgments cannot be both true, two contrary emotions might both be appropriate for different reasons. Instead of identifying emotions with judgments, we should take them as attitudes of a different sort. Unlike intellectual judgments, emotional attitudes are partial in the sense that they are based on reactions to particular facts, rather than on considerations of all relevant reasons. Greenspan illustrates her claim with the following example: If she and a friend are competing to be elected as chairperson of the same department and her rival wins, she may have mixed feelings. She can feel both pleased, at least to some extent, and pained—happy for him, since she knows that he deserves the honor and has been hoping for it, but unhappy on her own account, since her own desire has been frustrated. The demand to overcome this ambivalence in an emotion “all things considered” would be odd.

Greenspan also emphasizes the essential role that emotions fulfill in *motivating* behavior; sometimes ambivalence may be more rational for optimal behavior

than forming an “all things considered” attitude, as the agent’s own attitude is not so clear-cut. Constructive ambiguity may be valuable not merely in a relationship between two parties in which both have not yet fully made up their minds, but also concerning the agent’s own attitude—self-constructive ambiguity can be valuable when the agent has not arrived at a conclusive decision. Greenspan believes that conflicting emotional extremes can sometimes serve a purpose that would not be served by impartial moderation, because commitment to different perspectives can motivate behavior that is unlikely to arise from emotional detachment, typical of broad intellectual considerations. Hence, the “logic” of emotions permits ambivalence. This is in accordance with Freud’s claim that “Dogs love their friends and bite their enemies, quite unlike people, who are incapable of pure love and always have to mix love and hate.”¹¹

Christine Tappolet (*1963) from the University of Montreal works on meta-ethics, moral psychology, and the study of emotions. In her recent book, *Emotions, Value and Agency* (2016), she explores the analogy between emotions and sensory experiences, and the implications of this for our understanding of human agency.

Tappolet propagates the perceptual view of emotions.¹² In her 2012 article “Emotions, perceptions, and emotional illusions,” she argues that since emotions often misfire, the issue of illusion should be put center stage. Recalcitrant emotions (i.e., emotions that conflict with an accepted evaluative judgment), for example, being afraid of something we know is not dangerous, support, as Tappolet proposes, the perceptual view of emotions. Despite some obvious differences between emotions and perceptions, for example that only the former can be judged as rational and are more plastic than the latter, there are several major similarities that can justify the identification of emotions as a kind of perception. Following Roberts, Tappolet claims that emotions do not always involve evaluative judgments.

Tappolet holds a quite strong version of the perceptual account in that she does not restrict it merely to basic (i.e., pan-culturally shared emotions). Her view is strong also in the sense that she identifies emotions with value perceptions.

Notes

- 1 For an overview of cognitivist theories, see, e.g., Deigh 1994.
- 2 Harry G. Frankfurt’s view of love 1999 (Volume II) may also be associated with this approach. Frankfurt suggests that at the heart of love are the more or less stable motivational structures that shape the lover’s preferences and guide her conduct. For another version of the motivational approach, see Scarantino 2014.
- 3 Cf. Stocker’s 1987 notion of emotional seriousness.
- 4 See Pitcher’s 1995 moving book about his two dogs. In her chapter on animal emotion, Nussbaum 2001 refers to Pitcher’s book, admitting that with animals and babies no explicit, not to mention linguistic, judgments are necessary for emotions to occur.
- 5 For Frijda’s last thoughts about the nature of emotions, see Frijda 2016 and Mesquita 2016.

- 6 Frijda 2007: 15–16.
- 7 Ekman 1992.
- 8 Wittgenstein 1967: 174e.
- 9 Elster 1983: 111; see also McLendon 2013, for further comparisons between Sartre’s and Elster’s views in this regard.
- 10 For a clear reconstruction of Sartre’s position, see Wollheim 1999: 83–91.
- 11 Cited in the introduction to Bonaparte 1994.
- 12 For a helpful discussion of this view, see also Döring 2007.

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Part 1

HISTORICAL AND SYSTEMATIC SURVEYS